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Abstract 
 
Water pollution taxes, or effluent fees, have long been advocated by environmental 
economists as a regulatory approach to cost effectively achieve water quality improvements.  
The article reviews the arguments in favor of taxes and traces the history of the idea in U.S. 
policy debates. Particular attention is given to the institutional challenges presented by a tax 
system and its application in watershed contexts where transport phenomena are important. The 
article also addresses the question of why effluent taxes are so rarely seen in practice. 
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Water Pollution Taxes: 
A Good Idea Doomed to Failure? 
 James Boyd 
Introduction  
 
Economists have long advocated pollution taxes as a policy to improve water quality.  
One of the reasons water effluent taxes are embraced by economists interested in market-based 
policies is that sources of water pollution are varied and difficult to assess individually in terms 
of control costs.  In principle, taxes overcome this problem.  With a price—the tax—applied to 
pollution emissions, firms compare the price to their costs of emissions control.  If the price is 
higher than control costs, they reduce emissions rather than pay the tax.  Accordingly, with a 
price mechanism, high-control-cost firms abate less and low-control-cost firms abate more.   
When high-control-cost firms abate less than low-control-cost firms, a given level of pollution 
reductions is achieved at the least cost. Also contributing to the motivations for a tax approach 
are the way in which taxes promote innovation (relative to static quantity-based regulations) and 
the fact that taxes generate revenue.
1  This last characteristic is particularly pertinent since many 
water quality projects involve large investments in infrastructure. Treatment plants, sewer 
systems, and flow control devices like dams require large chunks of public financing.  Taxes 
promise a ready source of funds.    
Given these advantages, it is noteworthy that effluent taxes have not been widely 
adopted.  One of the questions addressed by this article is why effluent taxes are so rarely seen in 
practice.  The reasons lie both in politics and in economics.  Relative to “command-and-control” 
regulations—such as numerical, permit-based effluent limits—taxes are particularly desirable 
when pollution control costs vary across sources and are difficult for regulators to measure.  
However, taxes have distributional characteristics that are far different from command-and-
control regulations.  In particular, taxes require polluters to pay control costs as well as taxes on 
emissions that are not controlled.  Command-and-control policies only require polluters to pay Resources for the Future  Boyd 
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control costs.  This is a significant distributional difference that may explain the political demise 
of effluent tax policies. 
 A greater focus of this article, however, is on the institutional challenges presented by, 
and the efficiency of, effluent taxes.  Depending on the type of system imposed, taxes do not 
guarantee more efficient outcomes than more standard forms of regulation.  And, leaving politics 
aside, it can be institutionally demanding to put in place a system of effluent fees guaranteed to 
produce markedly better outcomes than more conventional systems of regulation.  But, despite 
these difficulties, there remains a strong set of arguments for the use of taxes to control water 
pollution.  The article will explore both the challenges and opportunities of a tax system.  In 
particular, we will characterize the informational and institutional barriers to successful 
implementation of water quality taxes.   
A distinguishing feature of the water quality problem is that environmental damages—
that is, the costs to society of pollution—are highly dependent on the location of pollution 
sources in the hydrological, social, and economic landscape.  First, the demand for water quality 
varies from location to location.  Some waterbodies are envisioned as pristine, where recreation 
and species support is the overriding concern.  Other waterbodies, such as those in urban areas 
where industrial effluent and development-related runoff are practical facts of life, serve a more 
complex set of objectives.  Second, a source’s location determines the way in which pollution 
ultimately affects surface waters.  The transport, diffusion, and cross-pollutant interactions of 
releases are highly idiosyncratic to location.  Upstream releases may be worse than downstream 
releases, because upstream pollution affects a longer stretch of the river course.  Riparian 
releases will tend to be worse than inland releases since there is a more direct hydrological 
connection between the pollution and surface waters.  Natural degradation and chemical 
interactions are also highly landscape-dependent.  For these reasons, uniform taxes may not 
satisfy water quality objectives or—putting it the other way around—if used to satisfy quality 
objectives, may not yield minimum aggregate control costs.  Spatial issues arise in most 
environmental tax contexts.  They are particularly important in the case of water quality, 
however, because the transport and deposition of water pollutants are dependent upon a 
particularly complex set of forces that are difficult to measure and model.  
We will explore these political, institutional, and economic issues in more detail by 
reviewing the literature on effluent taxes, the limited international experience with imposing 
such taxes, and the current state of water quality regulation in the United States.   
 Resources for the Future  Boyd 
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1. The Existing Approach to Water Quality Regulation 
Before turning to a description of effluent taxes, it is useful to briefly describe the status 
quo approach to regulation: command-and-control effluent reduction requirements.
2  The 
centerpiece of U.S. water quality regulation is the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) permit program.  The NPDES program requires polluters to obtain permits, or 
licenses, to discharge.  These permits specify pollution amounts that can be legally discharged.  
The limits are determined by reference to the “best conventional” control technology or “best 
economically achievable” control technology, depending on the type of pollutant.  The control 
technology standard in turn typically generates numerical concentration and aggregate volume 
limits.  Limits may also take the form of “allowable discharges per unit” of a facility’s 
production.  It is these numerical limits that are binding.  The actual technology used to achieve 
these numerical standards is up to the polluter.  For our purposes, the essential characteristic of 
this system is that it sets numerical, quantity-based limits on pollution.  We refer to this system 
as the “effluent standards approach.” 
It is important to note that NPDES permits are only required of so-called “point sources.”  
Point sources tend to be larger industrial and commercial facilities and public treatment facilities.  
Some large agricultural operations are considered point sources, but, by and large, runoff from 
farms, roads, lawns, and most small pollution sources are not directly regulated.  These 
“nonpoint sources” are the subject of increased scrutiny, since most of the nation’s remaining 
water quality problems are due to nonpoint pollution.
3  
In addition to the technology-based standards described above, regulation can impose 
additional controls on point sources if the waterbody to which discharges occur is in violation of 
state water quality standards.  Accordingly, these ambient water quality standards are a second 
line of defense if baseline standards fail to achieve water quality goals.  This tightening of permit 
conditions only works, however, if point sources are the source of the water quality violation.  If 
nonpoint sources are to blame, some other mechanism must be called into play.  This is one 
rationale for the so-called Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) program. A long-neglected 
aspect of the Clean Water Act (CWA), TMDL provisions require states to identify waters that 
are not in compliance with water quality standards, establish priorities, and implement 
improvements—including improvements that rely on nonpoint source reductions.
4 
In the future, the TMDL approach and the need to control nonpoint sources are likely to 
expand the nature of regulation.  The nature of the nation’s water quality problems make this 
almost inevitable, though many legal, technical, and political hurdles remain to be cleared.  Resources for the Future  Boyd 
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Starting from the in situ quality of waterbodies themselves and working backwards to address 
threats to quality sounds like simple common sense.  It is, but it is not how one would describe 
the current regulatory system.  The focus of the current system is on specific numeric discharge 
limits applied to a precisely defined universe of pollution sources.  The quality of surface waters 
themselves is a binding regulatory issue only if quality is adequately monitored and if point 
sources are found to be the source of the problem.   
Effluent taxes could play an important role in reducing nonpoint pollution and in 
improving the efficiency of point source control activities in the future.  History offers a 
cautionary note, however.  The idea of using effluent taxes to achieve compliance with ambient 
water quality standards is not new to the political arena or economic analysis.  A review of this 
history is therefore instructive.  
 
 
2. Effluent Tax Proposals: A Brief History 
The Water Quality Act of 1965 (WQA) was the first major statutory attempt to address 
the nation’s growing water quality problems.  The Act proved to be a weak basis for enforcement 
authority, but did yield one major improvement: the development of ambient water quality 
standards.  States were called upon to set their own standards and given flexibility to determine 
how standards would be met.  The Act’s major weakness was that it gave no concrete authority 
to force effluent reductions by specific polluters.
5  It was relatively straightforward to determine 
if ambient standards were being violated, but much more difficult to determine who was at fault.
6   
At the same time, however, economists were proposing effluent taxes as a policy that 
could both generate incentives to meet ambient quality targets and minimize the costs of doing 
so.
7  Moreover, proponents of effluent fees received a receptive hearing in the political arena.  
The Environmental Pollution Panel of the President’s Science Advisory Committee 
recommended in 1965 “that careful study be given to tax-like systems in which all polluters 
would be subject to ‘effluent charges’ in proportion to their contribution to pollution …. Effluent 
charges have enhanced effects because individual polluters always have a prospect of financial 
gain from further reductions in their contribution to pollution.”
8  In 1969, William Proxmire in 
the Senate and, in 1971, Lee Hamilton in the House introduced identical pieces of legislation 
calling for a national effluent charge.
9  Ultimately, these efforts went nowhere.  But they indicate 
that 30 years ago the effluent tax concept was considered to be a serious policy alternative.  Resources for the Future  Boyd 
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For this, credit is due to a set of economists and water quality engineers who were 
actively exploring the application of taxes to the problems of large, polluted watersheds.  In the 
mid-1960s, large studies of the Delaware River Estuary were undertaken to assess, among other 
things, the desirability of using effluent charges to control pollutants.  In 1967, Johnson reported 
that a “zoned” effluent charge program (where different tax levels were applied in different 
zones along the estuary) would cost half as much as a “uniform treatment” regulation.
10  Based 
on their own analysis of the Delaware Estuary, Kneese and Bower strongly advocated the use of 
charges for the same set of reasons: “The effluent charges procedure would have the advantage 
over other possible techniques of permitting each waste discharger to adjust in the most efficient 
way for his particular circumstances.”
11  They went on to argue that systems of charges, in 
conjunction with basin-wide approaches to water quality management, “may properly be viewed 
as a central tool of water quality management.  We feel that regional water quality management 
agencies should be provided with this tool.”
12  
It is also interesting to note that these studies took a broad, regional approach to water 
quality problems and acknowledged the role of not just industrial sources, but nonpoint sources 
as well.  In this respect, the work was particularly far-sighted.  Unfortunately, the institutions 
necessary to implement regional approaches did not exist at that time.
13  Current water quality 
regulation, as exemplified by the TMDL program, is returning to watershed-level, multi-source 
analysis of water quality impairments.  In the intervening years, however, water quality 
regulation took a more intermediate set of steps, focusing on direct quantity restrictions imposed 
on large point sources.  
With the passage of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) in 1972, the hope 
that effluent fees would be applied faded considerably.  The FWPCA established the NPDES 
permitting system and its associated uniform treatment provisions.  The government’s choice of 
uniform technology-based standards was understandable, given prevailing frustrations with 
enforcement.  But it effectively put an end to serious discussion of effluent fees as an alternative.  
The problem with the WQA lay in the implementation plans for ambient quality improvements.  
In particular, it was difficult to enforce specific reductions by specific polluters.
14  This failure 
generated a strong desire on the part of regulators and the concerned public to mandate facility-Resources for the Future  Boyd 
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specific reductions.  The FWPCA’s permit-generated uniform treatment standards directly 
addressed that desire.  According to a history of the legislation: 
 
“Most of all, Federal officials regretted that the [WQA] made no 
provision for effluent standards.  If federal water quality criteria included criteria 
for the quantity and quality of effluents and if implementation plans provided for 
the abatement of components of effluents, the task of enforcing standards would 
be greatly simplified.  Federal officials believed that it would be easier to prove 
that discharges did not meet effluent standards than it would be to prove that they 
caused the receiving waters to fall below water quality standards.”
15 
 
Treatment requirements imposed on individual firms were seen as the most direct 
response to pollution problems.  In the climate of the early 1970s, and given the lack of regional 
institutions in place, the desire to minimize compliance costs and use taxes to meet ambient goals 
was less strongly felt.  This is one explanation for the quantity-based regulatory system we have 
in place to this day.  To understand some of the other explanations, it is necessary to describe the 
characteristics of a tax system in more detail.   
Before doing so, mention should also be made of the European experience with effluent 
taxes.  As early as the 1960s, France imposed water charges on certain industrial polluters and 
the Federal Republic of Germany passed an Effluent Charge Law in 1976.
16  In fact, early 
economic proponents of tax-based systems looked to the French and German experiments as 
strong evidence that taxes were practical institutionally and a hopeful example for other 
countries.
17  Subsequent analysis has led to a reevaluation of these systems.  While the French 
and German governments continue to levy charges, the charge schemes act only in conjunction 
with treatment-based regulations, are primarily a revenue-raising instrument, and set taxes so low 
that they are unlikely in and of themselves to motivate significant abatement.
18  A particularly 
careful econometric study of the French program concluded that the French taxes are 
approximately one-half the level of measurable social damages.
19 Accordingly, the European 
experience’s relevance as a “tax success story” is limited.
20  One notable exception is in the 
Netherlands.  The Dutch program levies charges on both direct and indirect sources of Resources for the Future  Boyd 
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biochemical oxygen demand and heavy metals.  The revenues are then used to subsidize 
improved treatment.  What makes the Dutch program notable is simply that the fees are higher 
and have increased over time, and thus are capable of independently motivating reductions.
21  
Econometric analysis suggests that the Dutch effluent fees, rather than treatment standards also 
in place in the Netherlands, are responsible for significant improvement in water quality.
22  




3. ‘First-Best’ Taxation vs. the ‘Charges and Standards’ Approach 
The efficient outcome of regulation is to have each source control emissions up to the 
point where the marginal costs of further controls exceed the marginal social benefits of greater 
pollution reductions.  This definition is the easy part of policy design.  The difficult part is 
designing policies that, when implemented in the real world, approximate efficient control 
behavior.   
In theory, a tax-based policy and a command-and-control quantity standard can both 
achieve the efficient outcome.
23  With knowledge of the costs and benefits of pollution control, a 
regulator can simply require firms to engage in the efficient level of control.  The efficient level 
of control can be directly mandated, say via a permit requiring a certain level of treatment.  
Alternatively, an effluent tax can be applied, with increases in the rate if control is inadequate 
and reductions if the tax is excessive.  Both instruments can generate the efficient, “first-best” 
outcome.
24  Unfortunately, the equivalence of the two instruments, and their ability to generate 
the efficient outcome, break down in the face of real-world constraints. Perhaps the most 
important of these constraints is that regulators have limited information regarding both firm-
specific control costs and the benefits arising from reduced emissions.  When this informational 
constraint is taken into account, policy goals change.   
For the first-best outcome to be achieved, different pollution sources must be held to 
source-specific levels of control or be assigned source-specific tax levels.  This is true because 
the costs and benefits of control are unique to each facility.  Technologies, locations, and other 
circumstances differ in important respects from one facility to the next.  In practice, however, we 
cannot expect a regulator to easily determine these differences.  It is very difficult to externally Resources for the Future  Boyd 
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measure, or even infer, firms’ control costs.  It is also difficult to determine the social benefits of 
controls, since the benefits (i.e., the damages avoided) are often diffuse and are typically not 
reflected in easily observable prices.
25 For these reasons, the efficient, first-best policy outcome 
is not the relevant benchmark.  Instead, a more pragmatic question motivates the analysis of 
policy: namely, what is the best way to achieve a minimum level of ambient water quality in a 
waterbody?  This is a “second-best” policy question because it abandons the goal of finding the 
most efficient outcome.  Achieving ambient standards is a more limited and realistic goal.  As 
noted earlier, states must establish, with federal oversight, surface water quality standards.  
Taking these standards as given, and ignoring the question of whether the standards themselves 
are efficient, we now turn to ways in which standards can be met at minimum cost.   
This problem has been the focus of much of the economic literature on water quality.  
Because benefits are so difficult to measure, economists have long argued that the second-best 
problem is the most relevant one, at least as far as water quality policy is concerned.
26  In the 
words of Baumol and Oates, “It is hard to be sanguine about the availability in the foreseeable 
future of a comprehensive body of statistics reporting the marginal net damage of the various 
externality-generating activities in the economy.”
27  In contrast to the first-best goal, the ambient 
standard goal does not require the regulator or policy analyst to know the social marginal 
benefits of individual firms’ effluent controls. All that need be known is whether a given 
waterbody meets its quality standard.
28 
Regulators also lack good information about control costs.  Ideally, a regulator would 
tailor taxes or quantity standards on the basis of facilities’ control costs, so that facilities reduce 
pollution by different amounts.  But this is impractical.  In the words of Kneese and Schultze,  
 
“In practice, the need to tailor limits to each firm, and to consider for 
each the cost and effectiveness of all of the available alternatives for reducing 
pollution, would be an impossible task.  There are up to 55,000 major sources of 
industrial water pollution alone. A regulatory agency cannot know the 
technological opportunities, the alternative raw materials, and the kinds of 
products available for every firm in every industry.”
29   
 
Targeted fees or control standards tailored to the control costs and benefits of individual 
facilities—while efficient—are impractical from a real-world regulatory standpoint.  Resources for the Future  Boyd 
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If taxes and standards cannot be targeted, what is the alternative?  The alternative is 
uniform taxes and standards that apply to a range of facilities.  Accordingly, economists have 
turned much of their attention to these more realistic alternatives.  The literature compares two 
broad types of policy, the so-called “charges and standards” approach and a “uniform treatment” 
approach.  Under the charges approach, a uniform tax is applied to a set of polluters, with the tax 
level set high enough to induce aggregate effluent reductions adequate to meet an ambient water 
quality standard.
30  Under the uniform treatment approach, all firms are required to reduce 
emissions by an equal percentage or amount, sufficient to meet an ambient standard.  The 
uniform treatment policy roughly corresponds to the permit system currently in place in the 
United States.  When these two, more practical policies are compared, taxes appear to be 
significantly preferable.
31   
Taxes are preferable because they are flexible in a way that mandated reductions are not.  
With a tax system, not all facilities have to reduce pollution by the same amount.  Because 
facilities differ in their control costs, this flexibility is important.  Under a tax scheme, high-
control-cost firms abate less and low-control-cost firms abate more.  In aggregate, this means 
that a given level of ambient water quality can be achieved more cheaply than if all firms abate 




















 total control cost 
Facility 2 
 marginal control 
cost 
Facility 2  
 total control cost 
1  10 10 20 20 
2  20 30 40  60 
3  30  60  60  120 
4  40  100  80 200 
5  50 150  100  300 
6  60 210  120  420 
 
As an example, assume that two facilities contribute to water pollution in a lake and that, 
for the lake’s water quality to meet state standards, six units of pollution need to be eliminated.  
If the facilities’ control costs are as described in Table 1, we can easily compare the tax and 
uniform treatment policies.  A uniform treatment policy requires each firm to abate three units of 
pollution.  The aggregate cost of complying with the uniform treatment policy is therefore $180: 
$60 for Firm 1, and $120 for Firm 2.  Now consider an effluent tax equal to $45.  With the tax, 
the two firms do not make the same abatement decisions.  At that price, Firm 1 abates four units 
(because the marginal abatement cost of those units is less than the pollution price) and Firm 2 
abates two units (for the same reason).  In total, six units are abated, which meets the ambient 
goal.  But note that the total cost of abatement, $160, is now lower.
32  This savings is the benefit 
of a tax mechanism.  Also note that the regulator need know nothing about the firms’ respective 
control costs to achieve this result.  The tax can simply be iteratively raised (or lowered) until the 
water quality goal is met.  It is in this sense that “effluent fees … tend to elicit the proper 
responses even in the absence of an omniscient regulatory agency.”
33  
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4.  So Why Not Taxes? 
Given their virtues, we now turn to the question of why taxes are not more widely applied 
in practice.
34  Broadly, there are two classes of explanation.  First, taxes are politically 
unpopular, with opposition arising—for different reasons—from both the regulated and 
environmental communities.  Second, the economists’ argument that charges yield lower 
aggregate control costs than standards is not in fact always true.  Under certain circumstances, a 
price-based approach can yield higher aggregate control costs than a uniform treatment 
approach.  The reasons this is true are important to the design of any water quality regulation, 
and so we give them special attention in the following section.  But, as a result, economists 
cannot say that charges are always more efficient than uniform treatment standards.  This 
complication undermines the clarity of the policy prescription. 
 
4.1 Political Objections 
Political opposition to taxes as a control instrument comes from two quarters: the 
regulated firms themselves and environmental interests wary of the flexibility inherent in a price-
based approach.  To understand why regulated firms may oppose tax schemes, consider again 
Table 1. With a uniform treatment policy, as before, compliance costs are $60 for Firm 1 and 
$120 for Firm 2.  With a tax policy, abatement costs are $100 for Firm 1 and $60 for Firm 2.  
But, in addition, both firms must pay the tax on all units of pollution they do not abate.  The total 
compliance cost is therefore significantly greater.  For example, Firm 1 will pay the $45 tax on 
the two units it doesn’t abate, bringing its total compliance cost to $190 ($100+$90).  Firm 2 will 
pay the tax on the 4 units it doesn’t abate, bringing its total to $240 ($60+180).  These tax 
revenues can be used, in principle, to offset the social cost of pollution the firms continue to 
emit.
35  Taxes shift pollution costs onto the polluters.  This is socially desirable but can also be 
costly to firms if they cannot pass the tax on to consumers in the form of higher prices.
36  
Standards can also deter (or disadvantage) the entry of new firms and facilities if new sources are 
held to higher standards than old sources, as they often are.  From the standpoint of existing 
firms, this is an advantage.
37  
Environmentalists have resisted the use of charges on both ethical and pragmatic 
grounds.  The ethical complaint stems from resistance to the flexibility inherent in the charge 
concept—not all firms have to abate the same amount.  In the words of Bohm and Russell, “the 
polluter’s ability to choose how to react to a charge, the heart of the economist’s efficiency case, Resources for the Future  Boyd 
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is also the heart of the environmentalist’s opposition.”
38  Also, the idea of putting a price on 
pollution may be symbolically unattractive to some—despite the fact that it is the polluter who 
pays the price.   
Pragmatic opposition arises from fears that a system of charges is administratively and 
legally more difficult to implement, and thus subject to more potential abuse by presumably 
well-connected polluters.
39  This critique argues that the legal basis for defining appropriate 
charges is weaker and the challenges associated with monitoring compliance are greater.  As for 
taxes’ legal basis, it is true that existing U.S. water quality regulations provide a more sound 
legal basis for uniform treatment standards than for charge-based systems.  But that is because 
the regulations themselves are not designed to implement charges.
40  In principle, it is unclear 
why a charge-based system cannot be made legally sound—if the political will is present to do 
so.  Others focus on the administrative challenge.  In the words of one such critic, “Who is going 
to fix the charges, and how great are the chances that charges will be set higher or lower than 
some optimal level to satisfy the self-interest of particular interest groups?”
41  Of course, the 
same criticism can be leveled against the administrative procedures associated with setting 
appropriate treatment requirements.  The difficulty is clearly present, but it is unclear why 
charge-setters would be  more prone than standard-setters to ignore the public interest.
42   
A similar argument applies to the monitoring of uniform treatment and tax systems.  
Effluent charges require continuous monitoring so that the tax can be applied to actual 
discharges.  Consider the following description of the monitoring problem: “These 
measurements are complicated not only by the features of invisibility and inherent ‘fugitiveness’ 
… but by the variability of discharges with production levels, equipment malfunctions and 
operator actions; by the imprecision of measurement devices and the discrete sampling 
techniques used in many such devices; and by the awkwardness involved in obtaining entry to a 
discharger’s premises and setting up elaborate equipment in order to take the samples.”
43  This 
seems to place tax-based systems at a disadvantage, since under current treatment-based 
approaches, continuous monitoring of effluent rarely occurs.  Instead, the focus is on sporadic 
monitoring of installed treatment technology and effluent concentrations—which is easier to do.  
This draws the wrong conclusion, however.  The fact that continuous monitoring rarely occurs 
under treatment-based systems is a significant weakness in the implementation of that 
approach.
44  Monitoring the simple installation of a treatment technology is certainly easier than 
continuous monitoring.  But it is also far less effective.  Ideally, treatment systems should also 
feature comprehensive monitoring to ensure that treatment standards are being met on a Resources for the Future  Boyd 
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continuous basis.
45  Again, the argument is not that effluent fee monitoring is easy, but that the 
monitoring challenge is no less significant under a treatment approach.  
 
4.2 The ‘Transport Problem’ 
When a pollutant is released, its impact on the environment depends on numerous factors.  
Pollutants deposited on land, such as pesticides and fertilizers, are carried into surface waters by 
runoff.  Runoff is determined by climatic conditions, in particular rainfall, and by the geology of 
the region, including soil types and elevation gradients.  Some of the pollution will degrade 
naturally, some will be deposited in soils and groundwater, and some will impair surface waters.  
The fate of pollutants deposited directly into surface waters is similarly complex. Once 
introduced, a pollutant’s contribution to impairment is a function of the waterbody’s assimilative 
capacity (which is itself a function of climatic conditions), salinity, acidity, and other localized 
chemical characteristics.
46  The hydrology of the waterbody affects the mixing and transport of 
the pollutant.  Depending on the location of a release, and the nature of the pollutant, some 
pollutants will remain in-stream for long periods of time, while others will quickly degrade or be 
flushed from the system. 
This means that similar releases in different geographic contexts can have markedly 
different environmental consequences.
47  In principle, these spatial relationships can be described 
in a systematic way.  Hydrological systems can be characterized and described in formal terms.  
The better the description, the better are predictions of how a given release will effect a 
particular waterbody.  Transport models describe these relationships.
48  In the words of one water 
systems analyst, “the relationship between the quality of water and the contiguous environment 
is essentially the domain of mathematical models.”
49  Whether or not these models are practical 
and within the reach of contemporary science and regulatory budgets is an open question.  Such 
models attempt to depict an inescapable reality, however—namely, that the social consequences 
of pollutant discharges depend on the geographic context of the discharge. 
In the simplest terms, transport models divide the landscape into zones and define a 
matrix of transport coefficients associated with each zone.  These coefficients take the form of 
parameters aij, where each aij describes the impact of a unit of pollution released in zone i on 
surface water in zone j.
50 With a complete matrix, the transport of pollutants within a larger 
geographic area, such as a watershed, can be holistically described. 




     Releases   
  Zone 1  Zone 2 
Impacts Zone 1 a11 =  1  a21 = .4
 Zone  2 a12 = .2  a22 = 1 
 
A simple two-zone transport matrix might look like Table 2, where releases in a particular zone 
have a direct, one-to-one impact on that zone’s water quality, but a lesser impact on the other 
zone’s water quality.  
A corollary implication of Table 2 is that units of pollution that are controlled 
(eliminated) in one zone will not yield a one-to-one improvement in ambient water quality in 
another zone.  Pollution controlled in Zone 1 will directly improve Zone 1’s water quality.  The 
benefits will be less, however, in Zone 2. 
How do transport problems affect the desirability and implementation of effluent 
charges?  In a first-best world, the transport model is used to calculate the marginal social 
damages of a facility’s pollution.  A transport model is necessary because it describes the way in 
which actual pollution results in actual social damages in the broader landscape.  But, clearly, the 
informational challenge posed by this activity is immense.
51  Even in a second-best world, where 
we seek a minimum-cost policy for achieving an ambient water quality standard, a transport 
model is necessary.  The prescription in this case is to weight each firm’s pollution by its impact 
on ambient water quality (perhaps in another zone).  The least cost solution is arrived at only if 
each firm is induced to control its emissions to the point where marginal costs per weighted unit 
of pollution are equated across firms.
52  In practice, this means effluent charges that are not 
uniform across facilities, but are tailored to the transport characteristics of individual facilities.  
Effluent tax schemes that account for the transport problem retain their desirability: 
namely, they lead to unambiguously lower control costs than treatment standards. Unfortunately, 
locational differences are quite difficult to take into account, and facility-specific taxes are 
administratively complex to implement.
53 According to the U.S. EPA, a key challenge facing 
agencies is “the lack of highly developed, scientifically sound approaches to identify problems in 
watersheds and to predict the results of potential control actions on water quality.  While a wide 
variety of models are available, each comes with limitations on its use, applicability, and Resources for the Future  Boyd 
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predictive capabilities.”
54 But these are precisely the kinds of models necessary to do effective 
tax targeting.  So what about uniform charges?  Can we still say they are preferable to uniform 
treatment?  Unfortunately, the answer to this question is that “it depends.” The unfortunate fact is 
that when transport phenomena are taken into account, tax schemes do not necessarily 
outperform even a crudely applied treatment standard approach.   
The argument for charges over treatment standards is powerful and unambiguous until 
transport-related complexities are introduced.  When they are, a potentially troubling ambiguity 
emerges.  As noted by Rose-Ackerman in her 1973 critique of effluent charges: “When these 
complexities are recognized, it becomes apparent that, in any concrete application, an operational 
effluent charge may be a less efficient means of controlling pollution than a comparable non-
market regulatory device.”
55  Rose-Ackerman analyzed the realistic, second-best world where 
regulators lack facility-specific information about control costs and social damages—and 
therefore can apply only a uniform, nontargeted charge.  In that world, effluent fees can result in 
higher aggregate control costs than uniform treatment rules. 
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TABLE  3 
 
 
An example illustrates this possibility.  Table 3 is much like Table 1, showing the 
marginal and total costs of pollution control for two firms.  In this example, however, we 
consider the different effects of the two firms’ pollution on an impaired water segment.   
Referring to Table 2, assume that Firm 1 is in Zone 1, Firm 2 is in Zone 2, and Zone 2 has 
impaired water quality.  Further assume that six units of ambient pollution need to be reduced in 













 total control cost 
1  1 1  5  5 
2  2 3  10 15 
3  3 6  15  30 
4  4 10  20 50 
5  5  15  25  75 
6  6 21  30 105 
7  7 28  35 140 
8  8 36  40 180 
9  9 45  45 225 
10  10 55  50  275 
11  11 66  55  330 
12  12 78  60  390 
13  13 91  65  455 
14  14 105  70  525 
15  15  120  75 600 Resources for the Future  Boyd 
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a constraint that must be satisfied.
56   If q 1 and q2 are the units controlled by firms 1 and 2, 
respectively, Zone 2’s ambient water quality standard implies that  
 
a12q1 + a22q2 ≥ 6, or (0.2)q1 + q2 ≥ 6. 
 
Now consider the least-cost uniform treatment and uniform tax that satisfy the constraint.  
The least-cost uniform treatment standard requires each firm to reduce five units of pollution.  If 
the level of abatement is any lower, the ambient standard will not be met.
57  The total cost of the 
uniform treatment requirement is $90 ($15 + $75).  Now consider a uniform $15.01 tax on 
effluent.  With that tax, Firm 1 abates 15 units and Firm 2 abates three units.  This implies an 
ambient Zone 2 reduction of six units ((15)(0.2) + 3), which meets the goal.  Any tax below $18 
induces too little abatement.  The total cost of the uniform tax is $150 ($120 + $30).  Note the 
cost of the uniform tax is significantly higher than the cost of the uniform treatment standard. 
Taxes do not necessarily outperform rigid treatment standards.  This is the conclusion of 
a more complex—and realistic—model that depicts the realities of pollutant transport.  More 
specifically, uniform taxes applied to nonuniform sources are not necessarily more efficient than 
treatment standards.  It is very important to emphasize that targeted taxes— taxes based on 
individual facilities’ effects on ambient water quality—do not suffer from this ambiguity.  They 
remain clearly preferable to quantity-based standards.  Uniformity is the source of the ambiguity.  
Tax uniformity is a deal with the devil.  Uniformity makes implementation easier, but at a 
reduction in efficiency.
58  Under certain circumstances, the reduction in efficiency can erode the 
benefits of taxes to the point where even rigid quantity-based treatment standards are preferable.  
Empirical analysis confirms that this kind of outcome is a realistic possibility.  An empirical 
analysis of alternative policies applied (again) to the Delaware Estuary showed that a uniform tax 
was more costly than a uniform treatment standard.
59  
This conclusion must be placed in its proper perspective, however.  The example 
generated above, and the general class of cases where taxes underperform treatment standards, 
arise only in a special set of circumstances.  What is distinctive about the above example is that 
the high-cost facility (Facility 2) is also the high-benefit facility, in the sense that its emissions 
reductions more effectively improve water quality.  Facility 2’s reductions generate one-for-one 
reductions in Zone 2’s water pollution.  Facility 1’s reductions generate only one-fifth of these 
benefits.  Two offsetting effects create this situation.  On one hand, Facility 2 should abate less 
because it is the high-cost abater.  On the other hand, Facility 2 should abate more because it’s Resources for the Future  Boyd 
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the high-benefit abater.  In the example, the two effects closely match and it is desirable for the 
two firms to abate similar amounts.  This accounts for the uniform-treatment approach being the 
more efficient.
60   
A hybrid approach to effluent taxes can minimize the loss in efficiency that can arise 
from uniformity.  In particular, taxes can be targeted not to specific facilities, but to classes of 
facilities that feature broadly similar control costs.  And taxes can be targeted to different 
geographic zones.  For example, a particular tax rate can be uniformly applied to large industrial 
facilities that release directly into a waterbody.  A different tax can be applied to small sources 
that are more hydrologically isolated from water impairments.  This kind of tax “zoning” can 
dramatically improve the performance of effluent charges, and at a reasonable implementation 
cost.
61     
With a zoned system, confidence in the relative efficiency of a tax approach is restored.  
And even economists who emphasize the danger of naively applying tax schemes do not 
conclude that, on balance, more rigid approaches are preferable.
62  There is simply too much 
theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest that significant efficiencies will arise with the use 
of a price-based policy.  Empirical analyses of cost savings from incentive-based approaches 
(including both tax and trading schemes) typically find them to be significant.
63 
 
5. Doomed to Failure? 
U.S. water quality regulation is undergoing a significant shift toward watershed-level, 
water-quality-driven controls on the widest range of sources, including nonpoint sources.  
Because nonpoint sources represent the most significant unaddressed challenge in the water 
quality area, the potential use of taxes as a means to control nonpoint pollution deserves more 
attention than has been given to it in this short review.
64   
The preceding discussion has focused on emissions taxes—i.e., taxes on pollution 
actually released.  This presupposes that pollution can be measured, if imperfectly, at the point of 
release.  That assumption becomes less and less reasonable as the focus shifts to nonpoint 
sources.  After all, monitoring numerous small, and sometimes mobile, nonpoint sources looms 
as a large practical challenge.  Accordingly, much analysis of nonpoint pollution control taxes 
focuses on the inputs to polluting activities rather than the outputs of that activity.
65  For 
example, it may be more practical to tax fertilizer and pesticide sales than to tax the runoff 
created by the use of such products.  Resources for the Future  Boyd 
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Nonpoint sources also generate what are called “time varying discharges.”  As the term 
suggests, these discharges have an episodic, unpredictable nature.  For example, nonpoint 
releases can spike as a result of storms that generate increased runoff and surface water flows.  
These spikes cannot be ignored or “averaged away” since they can have disproportionately 
significant impacts on environmental quality.  And time varying discharges introduce uncertainty 
into ambient and source-specific monitoring protocols and increase the importance of 
continuous, rather than random, monitoring.  They also confuse the relationship between control 
activities and ambient water quality outcomes.  Nonpoint sources fear this confusion because it 
increases the regulatory risks they might face if called on to build in margins of safety adequate 
to insure against any episodic violation of standards.  These characteristics do not necessarily 
disadvantage taxes relative to uniform approaches to nonpoint pollution. Monitorable treatment 
standards featuring margins of safety adequate to guard against discharge spikes will also be 
disproportionately costly to implement.  Time varying discharges create barriers to nonpoint 
regulation generally, whether in the form of taxes or standards.  They also suggest that 
“dynamic” pricing and permit programs are the relevant, ideal benchmarks against which to 
judge the performance of nonpoint regulatory programs.
66  
In spite of the challenges, however, nonpoint water quality taxes are a policy issue with 
enough virtues—for academic commentators at least—to warrant additional thought, debate, and 
consideration.  Importantly, empirical analysis of nonpoint tax schemes is a focus of current 
literature.
67 
Nevertheless, the prospects for point and nonpoint source water quality taxes remain dim.  
Most clearly, sources want to avoid the additional costs imposed on them by pricing schemes.
68    
Moreover, the explicit pricing of pollution, and the flexibility given to sources to respond to 
prices, wins few fans in the environmental community.  This combination of source community 
and environmentalist opposition has been—and likely will be—politically fatal to the water 
quality tax concept. This is all the more true for nonpoint sources given the potency of 
agriculture as a lobbying force and the diffuse, numerous nature of urban and suburban sources. 
Returning to the question posed in the title, water quality taxes may be doomed, but they 
remain a very good idea.  The ability to innovate and adapt in response to a price signal, rather 
than a technological mandate, will always be a powerful motivation for market-based Resources for the Future  Boyd 
20 
approaches.  From an environmental standpoint, pricing pollution does something that the 
existing regulatory system does not: namely, make polluters pay for their pollution so that the 
full social cost of polluting activities is reflected in the prices of the goods and services we 
purchase.  Finally, the false dichotomy between “simple” command-and-control and “complex” 
pricing schemes should be resisted.  Command-and-control policies present a wider range of 
monitoring and other administrative difficulties than is widely appreciated.  Compared to current 
water quality regulation, water quality taxation is not orders of magnitude more difficult to 
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